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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KEVIN WRIGHT KTLLIAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRIORITY 2 
Case # 20020455-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Final Judgement and Commitment in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court, Duchesne, County, for jury conviction of one count of Operation of a Motor Vehicle 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Third Degree Felony. 
Mr. Killian was sentenced to probation on May 13, 2002. Mr. Killian's probation was 
later revoked and he was sentenced to one year in jail with review after nine months for possible 
placement in an in-patient treatment program. Both the original sentence and the revocation were 
issued by the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne, Eighth District Court. 
This appeal is filed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
Court has jurisdiction to review the conviction pursuant to §78-2a-3. 
No post trial motions were filed either by trial or appellate counsel. Mr. Killian is 
currently incarcerated in the Duchesne County Jail and is awaiting court review of his jail 
sentence. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There is one issue raised for appellate review: Mr. Killian asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not pursuing a theory of defense in which the jury could have found him guilty of 
public intoxication rather than DUI. Mr. Killian alleges that although his trial counsel filed a 
suppression motion on the issue and raised the issue in the preliminary hearing, she did not present 
the theory to the jury nor did she request a theory of defense instruction that would have allowed 
the jury to find him guilty of public intoxication rather than DUI. 
The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, specifically in a DUI 
case was again stated in State v. Wallace, P.3d (Utah App. 2002), in which this Court 
found that it is a question of law-citing State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this brief and 
pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or attached to this 
brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Kevin Wright Killian was charged with one count of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol (DUI) in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 on September 1, 2002 (Record of Trial 
Court (hereafter referred to as "R.", page 1). Herbert Gillespie filed a one count Information on 
September 5, 2001 alleging that Mr. Killian had four prior DUI convictions within the last ten 
years and therefore this case was enhanced to a Third Degree Felony (R. 2). 
Mr. Killian appeared in court on September 4, 2001 and pled not guilty to the charge (R. 
7). Trial Attorney Karen Allen was appointed to represent Mr. Killian and on October 15, 2001 
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waived the Preliminary Hearing (R. 21). On December 13, 2001 Karen Allen filed a 
Suppression/Pretrial Motion asserting that the case should be dismissed on the basis that the 
police knowingly allowed Mr. Killian-a suspected intoxicated person-to get in his motor vehicle 
in order to get him with a felony DUI rather than to arrest him for public intoxication when they 
first encountered him (R. 27). 
The County Attorney filed an amended Information on December 18, 2001 alleging 
essentially the same conduct and factual basis as the original Information (R. 32). On January 22, 
2002 Mr. Killian and counsel argued the suppression motion before the trial court and the trial 
court denied the motion (R. 39). 
Mr. Killian and counsel then requested and were granted a preliminary hearing on the 
amended Information on March 18, 2002 (R. 45) and the case was bound over for trial. 
Trial was held on March 26, 2002 and Mr. Killian was convicted in the one day jury trial 
of the DUI charge (R. 100-102). On May 16, 2002 Mr. Killian was sentenced to zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison and a five thousand dollar fine. The sentence was stayed and Mr. 
Killian was placed on probation with the condition that during the three years probation he was to 
be on Adult Probation and Parole supervision, pay a one thousand dollar fine or complete 
community service and serve one year in the Duchesne County Jail. The Court granted a review 
of the sentence after nine months to see if there was an in-patient alcohol treatment program 
available for Mr. Killian to enter into in lie of the remaining jail time (R. 108-109). 
The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on May 30, 2002 (R. 119). Appellate counsel has 
sought and was granted extensions up to and including December 18, 2002 in which to file the 
opening brief and such is now timely filed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officer Ammon Manning of the Roosevelt City Police Department has been employed as a 
city police officer and for six years prior was employed as a Duchesne County Sheriffs Deputy 
(Transcript of Trial, page 71). On September 1, 2001 Manning was eating lunch at Pinn Willies-a 
convenience store and restaurant-with a deputy Travis Tucker and Highway Patrol officer 
Stradinger (T. 72). Mr. Killian came into the store area and purchased beer. Manning could 
smell the odor of alcohol in the area where Mr. Killian had been and he was concerned (T. 73). 
Manning not only smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Killian but he seemed under the 
influence of alcohol because his eyes were glassy (T. 80) and "everything that accompanied him" 
(T. 81) indicated he was intoxicated. 
Manning watched Mr. Killian go into the bathroom, exit the bathroom, pick up a six pack 
of beer, pay for it and exit the store-all the while believing he was under the influence of alcohol 
(T. 83). 
Manning did not stop Mr. Killian to investigate whether or not he was intoxicated-in fact 
he did not make contact with him inside or outside the store in an attempt to determine if Mr. 
Killian was under the influence of alcohol (T. 73). 
Manning went back to the table and told trooper Stradinger to watch and see if Mr. Killian 
got into a vehicle and if he did, to stop him (T. 73). At no time did Manning or Stradinger 
investigate if the store had sold beer to an intoxicated person, if Mr. Killian was impaired to the 
point that it was a crime to purchase beer or if the public would be in danger if Mr. Killian drove a 
vehicle away from the store (T. 71-74). 
Stradinger went outside and got into his patrol car to follow Mr. Killian and pull him over. 
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However, Manning's car was blocking Stradingers and there was a delay while Manning moved 
his police car (T. 73). Stradinger followed Mr. Killian out onto the highway and off on a dirt road 
(T. 73). Manning followed Stradinger (T. 73). 
Manning arrived at the residence of Ray and Joann Pollard's where Stradinger had Mr. 
Killian out of his car and was performing field sobriety tests (T. 74). Manning asked Stradinger if 
his police video camera was on to catch the field sobriety tests and then went into Stradinger's car 
to turn on the video when Manning discovered it was not turned on up to that point (T. 74-75). 
Manning admitted on cross-examination that he knew Mr. Killian drank and that he was 
under..." (T. 88) although the sentence was cut off it is clear that Manning knew some of Mr. 
Killian's history (T. 86-89). 
Trooper Stradinger testified that he was in Pinn Willies restaurant on September 1, 2001 
when he saw Mr. Killian come into the store area and purchase a 12 pack of beer (T. 93). 
Stradinger was told by Manning to watch to see if Mr. Killian got into a car because Manning was 
sure he smelled alcohol on Mr. Killian (T. 94). Stradinger left the restaurant and got into his 
patrol car. He was blocked in by Manning's patrol car but quickly was able to pursue Mr. Killian 
out onto the highway and then onto a dirt road (T. 94-95). 
Stradinger activated his lights on the dirt road and Mr. Killian pulled over and exited the 
car at which point Stradinger smelled the odor of alcohol on him (T. 97-98). Stradinger made 
Mr. Killian perform field sobriety tests which Mr. Killian failed (T. 98-108) and then Stradinger 
arrested him and took him to jail where he performed a chemical breathalyser test on Mr. Killian 
(T. 108). 
Stradinger stated that it took Mr. Killian 2 tenths of a mile to pull over (T. 97-98) but he 
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also testified that Mr. Killian was on a dirt road and his truck was kicking up a dirt cloud behind it 
(T. 128). Stradinger did not testify to a driving pattern that indicated an impaired driver, he did 
not testify that Mr. Killian's failure to immediately pull over on the private drive was an indicator 
of intoxication-in fact no driving pattern or probable cause for the stop was given other than 
Manning's statement that Mr. Killian smelled of alcohol and was intoxicated in the store (T. 131-
140). 
Mr. Killian failed the field sobriety tests and was arrested for the DUI. The factual 
statements about the field sobriety tests are not included here as Mr. Killian is not arguing that he 
was not intoxicated or that the tests were inappropriate in any way. 
The jury found Mr. Killian guilty of the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol 
(T. 203) and that Mr. Killian had prior offenses and therefore the conviction was a felony (T. 
204). A pre-sentence investigation report was completed and Mr. Killian was subsequently 
sentenced to one year in jail with early release after nine months to an in-patient treatment 
program. Mr. Killian does not contest aspects of the sentence or revocation hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Killian asserts that with four prior DUI convictions he was known to law enforcement 
as a "drinker." Furthermore, he asserts that the police were anxious to see him charged with a 
felony. It is for that reason that the police officers at the store-who could smell alcohol on Mr. 
Killian and were under the belief that he was intoxicated-did not stop him at the store to inquire 
further. The police did not approach him, ask him to answer their questions or investigate any 
further while Mr. Killian was at the store. The police waited until Mr. Killian left the store and 
got into a motor vehicle and drove off before they even tried to pursue him. 
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If the officers did not have enough probable cause to stop Mr. Killian in the store to 
investigate if he was intoxicated, how did they have enough probable cause to stop him on the 
road? 
The theory of defense that Mr. Killian wanted presented was that the police knew him as 
"drinker" and they purposely did not stop in the store so that they could stop him later on in his 
car and get him with a felony DUI rather than a public intoxication misdemeanor. 
Although trial counsel raised the Motion to Suppress in the trial court prior to trial and it 
was denied, Mr. Killian asserts that she should have raised it before the jury and requested a 
theory of defense instruction that would have allowed the jury to find him guilty of public 
intoxication. By failing to assert this defense at trial and failing to ask fo the special jury 
instruction Mr. Killian now alleges that his trial attorney was ineffective in her representation of 
him.1 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Killian asserts on appeal that his trial attorney was ineffective in not pursuing his 
theory of defense at trial and requesting a special jury instruction. Trial counsel raised the issue at 
the suppression hearing and she pursued it a preliminary hearing. However, Mr. Killian asserts 
that had she pursued the theory before the jury and requested a public intoxication jury instruction 
that the outcome of his trial would have been different. 
In State v. Wallace, P.3d (Utah App. 2002), at issue was the states's request for a 
lesser included offense instruction. Mr. Wallace argued that the state should not have been 
Respite requests from appellate counsel, to date Mr. Killian has not responded to 
inquiries as to his desire to pursue any 23B remand or other issues on appeal. 
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afforded the right to submit the instruction. However, in that case, as in this case, the defendant 
did not preserve an objection on the record. When the defendant does not preserve the claim it 
can only be addressed on appeal if it one of plain error or if the trial counsel was ineffective in 
representation. 
In regard to plain error, the issue here is different. In this case the issue is one of the lack 
of defense theory and the requisite instruction to support the theory-not the erroneous inclusion 
of an instruction. Here Mr. Killian cannot support a claim of plain error in that he cannot show 
that the court should have proposed a theory of defense and the requisite instructions. Such a 
claim would be without merit. 
To establish plain error, Mr. Killian would have to show a) an error exists; b) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and c) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. As set forth above, Mr. 
Killian cannot argue the trial judge should have developed a theory of defense instruction for him. 
However, Mr. Killian does assert that the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel 
should apply in his case to allow this Court to review his claim-as it did in Wallace. 
Mr. Killian asserts that his trial counsel knew there was a claim to be raised regarding the 
officer's conduct. She had raised it in pre-trial motions. However, she failed to pursue that 
theory of defense in an in-depth manner at trial. It is touched on in closing argument and no 
specific jury instructions were given to support the theory. Mr. Killian asserts it was a very viable 
defense. There was no way in a small town that the group of police at the store did not know of 
Mr. Killian's prior four DUI convictions. Moreover, if he had a strong odor of alcohol and the 
police had probable cause to stop him-the stop should have occurred at the store. The police 
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never should have allowed Mr. Killian to get in the car and drive. If they did not have probable 
cause to stop him at the store-they did not have probable cause to stop him on the road. Mr. 
Killian believed then and does now that the police were setting him up. 
Although trial counsel touched briefly on this theory-it was not pursued adequately at 
trial. Furthermore, she did not request a public intoxication jury instruction as a theory of defense 
or lesser included offense instruction. 
In Wallace, this Court provided "The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "when the 
prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed lesser included offense, both the legal elements and 
the actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must necessarily be 
included within the original offense charged." citations omitted. Here, Mr. Killian asserts that the 
instruction should have been given-if not as a lesser included offense-then at least as a theory of 
defense instruction. 
" In pertinent part, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 states, "A person may not operate . . . a 
vehicle within this state if the person: . . . (ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle." Id. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii)" 
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-701. Intoxication - provides that a person is guilty of public 
intoxication when: 
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled 
substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the 
person may endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he 
unreasonably disturbs other persons. 
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Mr. Killian asserts that public intoxication should be a lesser included offense or at the 
minimum a theory of defense jury instruction and that his trial counsel should have pursued his 
defense theory with vigor and then submitted the requisite instruction to support his defense 
argument. Both require intoxication to a point that dangerousness to self or others becomes an 
issue. Mr. Killian asserts that the police should have stopped him in the store and charged his 
with public intoxication rather than to set him up for the DUL He believes that if that theory was 
proposed in a more effective way to the jury and if they had the option to convict him of public 
intoxication rather than DUI that they would have. 
Mr. Killian asserts that by failing to assert the defense theory and failing to submit the 
instruction that his trial counsel's actions fell below the standard necessary for effective 
representation. Again, in Wallace, the defendant raised the issue and this Court held: 
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Wallace] must establish (1) 
that his trial counsel's performance was * deficient,1 and (2) that he was ' prejudiced' by the 
ineffective assistance." citations omitted. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Killian must show that defense 
counsel's representation "'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" and that, but for 
the deficient representation, there is a "reasonable probability" that the result would have been 
different. . . . "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 
(1984). 
Mr. Killian asserts that to raise his theory of defense in pretrial motions and then to all but 
abandon them at trial in front of the jury was ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, he asserts 
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that failure to submit a jury instruction on public intoxication fell below the objective standard of 
reasonableness. Finally, he argues that but for the failures on the behalf of trial counsel the result 
in his jury trial would have been different. Mr. Killian is sure that he would have been found 
guilty of public intoxication and the jury would have seen through the set up by the police oflficers 
had defense counsel been more vigilant. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Killian respectfully requests that this Court to vacate his conviction for a Third 
Degree Felony on the basis that at most the jury should have convicted him public intoxication but 
due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel the jury was never presented with the 
appropriate defense or applicable jury instruction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / fr day o f f ^ r ^ ^ C c , 2002. 
,<? 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Criminal No. 011800098 
Judge John R. Anderson 
-oooOooo— 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (WITH 
PRIORS) - A THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
The above-entitled case came before the Court for Sentencing on Monday, May 13, 2002, 
the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, presiding. The defendant was present and was 
represented by his attorney, Karen Allen. The State of Utah was represented by Herbert Wm. 
Gillespie, Duchesne County Attorney. The Court had received the Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. Statements were made by counsel for the 
parties. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
That the defendant has been convicted by a Jury of the offenses of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With Priors), a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Section 41-6-44 UCA (1953) as amended. 
That for the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With 
Priors), a Third Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison, and to pay a fine in 
the sum of $1,000. 
The foregoing prison sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on supervised 
probation through for a period of three (3) years upon the following terms and conditions: 
1. The defendant shall serve one (1) year in the Duchesne County Jail, with a review of 
this sentence in 180 days to determine\if the defendant has arranged to enter into an in-house 
alcohol/drug treatment program. The defendant shall report to the Duchesne County Jail no later 
than 2:00 p.m. on Monday, May 20, 2002, to begin this period of incarceration. 
2. The defendant shall pay the fine in this matter on terms set forth by Adult Probation 
and Parole or shall perform 200 hours of community service at the direction of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
3. The defendant shall not possess or consume alcohol or be where alcohol is being 
possessed or consumed or frequent any establishment where alcohol is the chief item of order. 
4. The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse treatment program to 
include AA/NA meetings, as recommended by his probation officer. 
5. The defendant shall install an Interlock Device, at his own expense, on any vehicle 
that he operates. 
6. The defendant shall not associate with or remain at any residence where alcohol or 
drugs are being used. 
7. The defendant shall be subject to warrantless searches by any law enforcement officer 
to ensure compliance with the terms of his probation agreement. 
8. The defendant shall carry with him at all times the offender identification card 
provided to him by Adult Probation and Parole and present the identification card to any law 
enforcement officer with whom he comes in contact. 
9. The defendant shall take Antibuse as directed by Adult Probation and Parole if it is 
cleared by a doctor. 
DATED this ±Z_ day of May, 2002. 
IE COURT 
'JOHNR. ANDERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
GJKU) UKJU.} 
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